

HINGE NORMATIVITY: FROM NEO-KANTIAN CONSTITUTIVISM TO UNCONDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE¹

*NORMATIVIDAD DE GOZNES: DEL CONSTITUTIVISMO
NEO-KANTIANO AL CONOCIMIENTO INCONDICIONADO*

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Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to anchor the basic principles of judgmental performances into reality, and thus, to capture the vertical axis of cognition. To this end, it is argued that the normative force of explicit, discursive self-knowledge is neither merely grounded in dialectical inescapability nor in default assumptions. The goal is to argue that the ultimate überhinge is so perfectly known that the questions of justification, truth-value and empirical cognoscibility lose any sense in regards to it. Hinge normativity, which can be reduced neither to epistemic (telic) normativity nor to practical normativity, emerges from this view. The shortcomings of neo-Kantian views of the sources of normativity in gnoseology are exposed and analysed.

Keywords: Agency; Constitutivism; Epistemic Normativity; Hinge Epistemology; Self-knowledge; Virtue Epistemology.

Resumen: El objeto de este artículo es el de mostrar que los principios fundamentales de la actividad judicativa se encuentran inherentemente fijados a la realidad. Se trata, por tanto, de

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