

## THE REHABILITATION OF GLOBAL SCENARIOS IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELIABILISM

*Abstract:* In this paper, our objectives are: (i) To provide an outline of the motivations, arguments and limits of the neo-Pyrrhonian skepticism championed by Robert Fogelin, a position which poses one of the central challenges in contemporary epistemology. (ii) To show how Ernest Sosa, appealing to the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, to the intuitive force of radical skeptical hypotheses, and to a conception of “proof” beyond the requirements of evidentialism, has vindicated global scenarios in epistemology. (iii) To assess the role played by the dream argument in Sosa’s *A Virtue Epistemology*, according to the goals and procedures which define reliabilism. (iv) To propose a circumspect rationalism capable to validate experience without rejecting the fact that sensations and empirical beliefs can be construed non-epistemically.

*Key words:* R. Descartes - R. Fogelin - E. Sosa - L. Wittgenstein - Circumspect Rationalism - Dream Argument - Global Scenarios - Reflective Knowledge - Reliabilism - Ultra rationalism.

### LA REIVINDICACIÓN DE LOS ESCENARIOS GLOBALES EN EL CONFIABILISMO EPISTEMOLÓGICO

*Resumen:* Las pretensiones del autor son: (i) Proporcionar una presentación general de las motivaciones, argumentos y límites del escepticismo neo-pirrónico introducido por Robert Fogelin en el panorama epistemológico contemporáneo. (ii) Mostrar cómo la distinción entre conocimiento animal y conocimiento reflexivo, el carácter intuitivo de las hipótesis escépticas radicales y un concepto de “prueba” que trasciende los límites del evidencialismo, han permitido a Ernest Sosa reivindicar el empleo de escenarios globales en epistemología. (iii) Evaluar la posición otorgada por Sosa al argumento del sueño en relación con los objetivos y procedimientos del confiabilismo. (iv) Reivindicar un racionalismo circunspecto capaz de otorgar veracidad a la experiencia aún aceptando la posibilidad de una construcción no-epistémica de las sensaciones y las creencias empíricas.

*Palabras clave:* R. Descartes - R. Fogelin - E. Sosa - L. Wittgenstein - Argumento del sueño - Confiabilismo - Conocimiento reflexivo - Escenarios globales - Racionalismo circunspecto - Ultra-racionalismo.

1. The two volumes of Ernest Sosa's *Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge*<sup>1</sup> are called to be one of the most important singular contributions written in the last three decades to debates in analytic epistemology. This valuable work is an outstanding example of balanced judgment and wise compromise, where Sosa, combining the logical rigor of a set of concepts coined by himself (accuracy, adroitness, aptness, safety, sensitivity...) with his mastery to deploy illuminating metaphors, aims at overcoming some of the most prominent (and embarrassing) conundrums in contemporary analytic philosophy: problems generated by Gettier cases, endless controversies between foundationalists and coherentists and between internalists and externalists<sup>2</sup>, and, over all, the challenge of *radical skepticism* in epistemology, a challenge recently reinterpreted, revived and extended in a major work by Robert Fogelin<sup>3</sup>.

Two core ideas make up the scaffolding of his anti-skeptical strategy: (i) The distinction between *animal* and *reflective knowledge*, that is to say, between apt belief *simpliciter* or a belief whose truth is creditable to the believer's competence<sup>4</sup> (according to Descartes' terminology, animal knowledge is equivalent to *cognitio*), and apt belief aptly noted or someone's knowledge that he knows that *p*<sup>5</sup> (reflective knowledge is, in Descartes' words, *scientia*). (ii) The requirement of *reasonable safety* (not of absolute safety<sup>6</sup>) for ordinary human knowledge, a requirement which discharges the ordinary epistemic claims from the unfeasible task of disproving scenarios of hyperbolic and radical deception and which dismantles the skeptic's charge of incoherence against common sense: that com-

1 E. Sosa, 2007, *A Virtue Epistemology. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I* (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press). E. Sosa, 2009, *Reflective Knowledge. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II* (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press).

2 The title given by Sosa to his contribution to the volume (in honor of Robert Fogelin) *Pyrrhonian Skepticism*, is significant: Cf. E. Sosa, 2004, "Two False Dichotomies: Foundationalism / Coherentism and Internalism / Externalism", in: W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), 2004, *Pyrrhonian Skepticism* (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 146-160.

3 Cf. R. Fogelin, 1994, *Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification* (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press).

4 E. Sosa, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

6 Absolute safety amounts to sensitivity, where someone's belief that *p* is sensitive "if and only if were it not that *p*, he would not (likely) believe that *p*." (E. Sosa, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 25) By contrast, a belief that *p* is safe provided it would have been held only if (likely) *p*.

In other words, while a belief is unsafe when fragile, when it would be easy for that belief to be false; a belief is *not* sensitive if it would be possible to believe that *p* when not *p*. Because the strong conditionals do not contrapose, a belief can be safe without being sensitive: my belief that I'm in Salamanca is not sensitive, insofar as I could be a brain in a vat in Alfa Centauri and yet to believe that I'm in Salamanca; but it is safe, because that radical scenario is too remote and, therefore, too difficult to be true.

mon sense establishes (or, at least, accepts) *conditions of knowledge* which is incapable to accomplishing.

Ironically, these very theses are deployed by Sosa in order to vindicate *global skeptical scenarios*, or, in other words, in order to reintroduce and to achieve a *complete and wholesome rehabilitation* of Cartesian skepticism in contemporary philosophy.

I'll divide this paper in three parts.

First (paragraphs two and three), I'll provide an outline of the fate of skepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy, thus providing the necessary *background* for understanding both the epistemological and contextual conditions Sosa is responding to, and the procedures that he uses for silencing deflationary accounts of skepticism, or, borrowing from his technical vocabulary, for avoiding "avoidance strategies"<sup>7</sup> whose aim is at showing that skeptical doubts are idle or senseless.

In second place (paragraphs four and five), I'll place Sosa's *direct* approach to the dream argument (a hypothesis which constitutes the paradigmatic example of global scenario) in the wider context of the principles and requirements which make up the scaffolding of his *virtue epistemology*. In this respect, I'll try to underline what I deem a *disquieting tension* between the anti-skeptical procedures permitted and required by *reliabilism* and the role played by the dream scenario in the *general epistemological project* sketched in *A Virtue Epistemology*; a tension resulting from the *fluctuating meaning* given by Sosa to the target-beliefs of the dream argument: a general belief concerning the *existence of physical objects* and *individual perceptual beliefs* which are difficult to gainsay; beliefs which sometimes he views as *rational intuitions* which our wills are *compelled* to affirm, and other times as mere *strong inclinations* whose falsehood would be possible for us to suppose or to feign or to *imagine*. Descartes could easily sidestep this difficulty.

Finally, and once explained where dreaming skepticism's significance comes from and what it comes to, I'll assess the first of the two arguments provided by Sosa in order to rule out the dreaming scenario, an argument which replaces the orthodox conception of dreams (called by Sosa *the hallucination model*) by a novel vision (*the imagination model*), and which, in my opinion, introduces a highly controversial post-wittgensteinian thesis (that a coherent skeptical use of dreams necessarily entails to doubt of introspective knowledge, and hence, that *we cannot be thinking while dreaming*), and it results, not in what I would like

7 E. Sosa, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

to call “Sosa’s New *Cogito*”, but in an unlimited and uneliminable version of extreme skepticism, one which, at least, is irrefutable in a context which I’ll label as “object-level doubt”.

**2.** One particular version of skepticism, the so-called Cartesian skepticism (a variety of skepticism which deploys such scenarios as those proposed by Descartes in the First Meditation), was under constant attack during the last century. Austin, Bouwsma, Ryle, Strawson, or, in more recent times, Michael Williams, Barry Stroud and Stanley Cavell, have been so effective that almost nobody holds this position nowadays.

What is problematic with Cartesian skepticism? Mainly two things: that the skeptical scenarios really are reasons for doubting our *ordinary beliefs*, that is to say, that they are used by radical philosophers in order to challenge our common beliefs of everyday life (“Here is a hand”, “I’m a human being”, “Physical Objects continue to exist when unperceived”...), something which cannot be done without endangering the very conditions of a reasonable doubt; and the fact that traditional skeptical arguments are (allegedly) either committed to obscure, bizarre and meaningless philosophical doctrines and contentious entities (for instance, sense data and internalist conceptions of meaning) or they are what Michael Williams called “*unnatural doubts*”<sup>8</sup>, those resulting from the employment of language under conditions stipulated arbitrarily by the philosopher, such that the language so employed has ceased to have any meaning.

What were the consequences of these criticisms? Obviously, Cartesian skepticism was rejected. But, because it was considered that Cartesian skepticism was the *only possible sort* of general and philosophical skepticism, this rejection amounted to a *redirection* of epistemology: skepticism was ruled out from debates; among epistemologists it was a common assumption that we *do possess* knowledge, and thereby that the task of a theory of empirical justification was *not* to show *that* knowledge is possible, but *how* it is possible.

Fifteen years ago Robert Fogelin burst this fixed situation, refusing to equate general skepticism with Cartesian skepticism. Like Sextus Empiricus in the ancient world he championed Pyrrhonian skepticism in the contemporary world. His goal was to reintroduce the question about if *knowledge in general* is possible in epistemological debates, task which required a sort of skepticism at least as radical as Cartesian skepticism but without the caveats and commitments which turned this position (because it might be possible to bring forth arguments show-

<sup>8</sup> Cf. M. Williams, 1991, *Unnatural Doubts. Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism* (Oxford / Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell).

ing that classical skeptical scenarios are conceptually incoherent) into a vulnerable one. In other words, Pyrrhonian skepticism *had to be* immune against the charge of *meaninglessness* without losing momentum. How to accomplish these conditions? How could Pyrrhonian skepticism spare common beliefs of everyday life and yet raise radical doubts without appeals to skeptical (and unnatural) scenarios? How might skepticism be *unlimited, natural and harmless to ordinary beliefs*?

According to Fogelin, it is easy to raise radical skeptical doubts by *checkable but unchecked defeaters*, that is to say, pointing to some *uneliminated but eliminable possibility* that can defeat a cognitive claim<sup>9</sup>. For instance, if *x* (riding his car by fields dotted with barns) claims that he knows that a particular building is a barn, we could defeat his claim asking: “Couldn’t it be a fake-barn, a papier-maché figure which *seems* a barn? If you don’t eliminate that possibility, you really don’t know what you say to know.” We could extend this skeptical procedure to birds, zebras (“is this a zebra or a painted donkey?”), our surroundings (we might recall “The Truman show”), or even to examples of knowledge as unproblematic and over-supported as those regarding our personal identity, name and origins<sup>10</sup> (it would be enough to remember the possibility of a mix-up in the hospital); which implies that, without employing global scenarios, we’re capable to raise doubts as strong as Cartesian doubts.

It’s important to notice the difference between this procedure and Cartesian *global* scenarios. The dream argument is a good example of global scenario. If this argument provides a reason for doubt the present experience, then, because if I may be dreaming now I may be dreaming at any time, it provides also a reason to doubt whatever experience we appeal to in order to rule out that possibility (I could be dreaming of shaking my head or pinching my face as means to settle the question whether I’m fast sleep or awake). In contrast, Fogelin deploys *ordinary grounds for doubt* (“ordinary” because they are eliminable by definition and because the candidates to defeaters are *remote*, but not fantastical) with the same scope of global doubts. Free of assumptions and innocent of conjuring tricks, the Pyrrhonian skeptic accuses the Cartesian skeptic of not being *skeptical enough*.

Pyrrhonian skepticism is unlimited and natural, but does it keep untouched ordinary beliefs and commonsense standards of epistemic appraisal? Fogelin

9 R. Fogelin, 1994, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-204.

10 “Do I, for example, know my own name? This seems to me to be as sure a piece of knowledge as I possess. But perhaps, through a mix-up at the hospital, I am a changeling. I’m really Herbert Ortcutt, and the person who is called ‘Ortcutt’ is actually R.J.F. These things, after all, do happen. Given this possibility, do I know my own name? I’m inclined to say that I do not...” R. Fogelin, 1994, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

coined the expression “levels of scrutiny” in order to solve this problem. In daily life, those levels are low and undogmatic, and we are trained to use ordinary epistemic concepts bracketing as well metaphysical as remote skeptical possibilities. The Pyrrhonist undogmatically accepts the normal practices of his culture, entering into the forms of life of his community. According to him, *nothing is wrong* with those rules (or with following them)<sup>11</sup>. But if the modest claims of ordinary life are burdened (in reflection) with a metaphysical emphasis, so that what I wish to stress when I say that I know that *p* is that *I cannot be mistaken about p* or that *it’s certain that p* or that *God himself cannot mislead me about p*; levels of scrutiny have been tacitly *heightened*. Only in this new context the Pyrrhonist deploys his repertoire of defeators, denying justification to our claims. He assembles reminders of the *fragility* of our knowledge, arguing that we don’t know what we think we do. But, because our epistemic practices are “the given”, because *we accept them without justification*, this denial doesn’t imply rejecting our ordinary cognitive claims. They don’t need justification in order to be accepted; therefore, the Pyrrhonist can reject the possibility of justifying our beliefs and our rules and yet keep them without contradiction. In contrast to the (so-called) Cartesian skeptic (and his presuppositions), the Pyrrhonist *has not*

11 Fogelin is providing a faithful and accurate account of the old Pyrrhonian views about the relation between common sense and skeptical reflection. It is apposite to quote Sextus Empiricus on this topic. He writes:

“Hence not only do we not conflict with everyday life, but we actually join the struggle on its side, assenting without opinion to what it has found convincing and taking a stand against the private fictions of the Dogmatists.” J. Annas; J. Barnes, (eds.), 2000, *Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), II, § 10, p. 93.

One last remark: in spite of the general agreement between Fogelin’s doctrine and Sextus’s quotation, there is a difference, which seems small but is capable to opening a chasm between Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism. It is contained in the quoted expression “private fictions of the Dogmatists”. Fogelin defends that a radical skeptic can be truly skeptic accepting ordinary epistemic rules because they *don’t need to be justified in order to be accepted* (they are there, like our life); but he thinks that Pyrrhonian arguments are *natural*, that is to say, that when the Pyrrhonist shows that we don’t know anything he is applying the *ordinary concept of “knowledge”*, drawing the entailments and semantic implicatures of a concept whose meaning (and commitments) are ignored in everyday life for practical reasons. In this sense, Fogelin sees Pyrrhonism not as a defense of common sense, but as a *feasible accommodation* with common sense. By contrast, Sextus Empiricus is suggesting that Pyrrhonism can defend common sense because the Dogmatists tacitly change the ordinary meaning of “to know”, burdening the concept with *unnatural epistemic requirements*. The ordinary man *really knows*. His beliefs are justified because they have *grounds enough*..., and enough is enough. This skeptic looks like a reader of Austin’s *Sense and Sensibilia*, or of Strawson’s *Scepticism and Naturalism. Some Varieties*. Fogelin would charge him (rightly, I think) with *dogmatism*: after all, he seems to defend a particular *theory of justification*, one which could be labeled as “a social theory of justification”. The “austinian” skeptic could reply using the same charge, but our intuitions are closer to Fogelin than to him.

to know with absolute certainty in order to gain the right to say (in ordinary or bracketed contexts) that he knows.

Finally, it is apposite to underline that Fogelin doesn't endorse a deflationary account of the epistemological project and its requirements, namely, that he doesn't judge the *quest of certainty* as something senseless, unnatural or idle. It is an unfeasible task, but a natural one. According to his point of view, because the meaning of "to know" is *constant* through different levels of scrutiny, in other words, because what the dogmatist and the ordinary man mean saying that they know that *p* is just the same, Pyrrhonian arguments are *natural*, and thus when the Pyrrhonist show that we don't know anything he is applying the *ordinary concept of "knowledge"*, drawing the entailments and semantic implicatures of a concept whose meaning (and commitments) are ignored in everyday life for practical reasons.

What is changed when the level of scrutiny varies is not the meaning of what is said, *but the meaning of saying it*. Fogelin considers that levels of scrutiny refer to *degrees* in the *illocutionary force* of cognitive sentences. Ironically, he deploys Austin's notions and Grice's distinctions<sup>12</sup> in what seems the most radical and effective version of skepticism produced in the last century, one which, along with some remarkable travelling companions: full-fledge anti-skeptical strategies, claims to be Wittgenstein's brood.

**3.** Sosa's most characteristic strategies are understandable against the background just outlined. He aims at showing that, making some adjustments, Cartesian skepticism is *defensible* (and that it can be *left behind* under the assumption of his procedural correction)<sup>13</sup>, and that Fogelin's response to semantic or linguistic critiques to skepticism is both too radical and not radical enough.

The distinction between animal and reflective knowledge (inspired by Descartes himself) is deployed by Sosa in order to *seal off commonsense beliefs from global skeptical scenarios* without having either to throw away allegedly *nonsensical* epistemological conundrums from the not open to appeal court of "ordinary language" or to reduce to *paradox* those same ordinary claims of knowledge from philosophical standards which, requiring objective certainty, are *too high* for everyday life. Making concessions both to Descartes and Moore,

12 Cf. R. Fogelin, 1994, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.

13 Consider his preliminary statement: "My overall aim is to present a kind of virtue epistemology in line with a tradition found in Aristotle, Aquinas, Reid and especially Descartes (though none of these advocates it in all its parts), and to shine its light on varieties of skepticism, on the nature and status of intuitions, and on epistemic normativity." E. Sosa, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

Sosa gains the right to make *no* concession to radical defenders of common sense or to radical Cartesians. The epistemological Modern project makes sense because it makes sense *to defend beliefs in the arena of reflection*, that is to say, because it makes sense an *enlightened perspective*<sup>14</sup> whose goal is *to integrate* what one claims to know with confidence and what one can *justify* (with reasonable safety) to know. But, since ordinary requirements are *lower*, one belief can be animal knowledge without being reflective knowledge. In agreement with Moore, Sosa says that it is true that I know (animal knowledge) that there is at least one external object (the hand that I'm raising); which doesn't mean that I know that I know that there is a hand here (reflective knowledge). This distinction neutralizes the first caveat we mentioned against the Cartesian project (and the Cartesian skepticism which involves): the risk of endangering common sense. Obviously, this version of Fogelin's "levels of scrutiny", free of controversial commitments, correct independently of any theory concerning the *meaning* of "to know" (do cognitive claims mean the same in philosophical and ordinary contexts?), *improves* its immediate precedent. His refusal to advance contentious semantic theses is *not* the smaller merit of Sosa's proposal.

But, in my opinion, Sosa's most interesting contributions to the understanding of skeptical strategies are both his merciless refutation of deflationary approaches to epistemological justification, and his tacit rejection of Fogelin's skeptical arguments and the associated (and explicit) vindication of *global scenarios* in epistemology.

Regarding the first point, his main targets are *naturalism* and Wittgenstein-inspired interpretations of basic perceptual beliefs as *normative rules*.

*Epistemological naturalism* is the position attributed to Hume and to Wittgenstein by the late Peter Strawson, himself an early exponent of this view<sup>15</sup>. It is a clear instance of deflationary account of skepticism whose aim is at showing that skeptical doubts are senseless.

According to this perspective, Wittgenstein discovered a kind of beliefs, usually called "hinge-beliefs", which, alluded to by the figures of scaffolding, framework, background and substratum, are different in nature from the rest of

14 "Suppose Descartes accepts the Pyrrhonian problematic, and accepts also Sextus' contrast between attainments in the dark and those that are enlightened. In that case he faces this question: is enlightened knowledge possible for us? Can we attain an enlightened perspective on what we believe and on our ways of acquiring and sustaining beliefs, one that reveals the sufficient reliability of those ways? This, I submit, is what sets up Descartes' epistemological project." E. Sosa, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

15 Cf. P. F. Strawson, 1985, *Scepticism and Naturalism. Some Varieties* (London / New York: Routledge 2008).

our propositions. These are the original, natural, inescapable commitments which we neither choose nor could give up; the rules which we must take for granted in all our reasonings and which we simply *cannot help* believing; the principles which, beyond our cognitive categories, are “something animal.”<sup>16</sup> Because we are compelled to believe them and because in our language they play the role of rules which, lacking *factual content*, regulate our experience, they can be *neither grounded nor refuted or doubted*. As a result, there is no such a thing as the reasons for which we hold these beliefs, and thereby skeptical arguments and traditional proofs against skepticism are equally *idle*. In short, our unshakeable convictions are justified because unshakeable.

In Sosa’s opinion, this view is faulty for several reasons: (i) Whether we cannot help believing a given proposition is one thing; whether it is epistemically acceptable to us to believe it is quite another. Therefore, this position either conflates *causal explanation* and *epistemic justification* or, depleting epistemic justification, it makes the counter-intuitive claim that it has no sense to defend our beliefs in the *arena of reflection*. (ii) Because this view attempts to show that, after all, our beliefs are *justified* because they are *inescapable*, it smacks of paradox or even contradiction (are they justified because it makes no sense to justify them?). (iii) It fosters a *cognitive quietism* which is incapable of distinguishing prejudices and grounded beliefs, the pathological and the acceptable, mechanisms of belief inducement and epistemic justification. A neurotic cannot help believing that there is a universal collusion against him. According to the Strawson’s picture of *On Certainty*, the attempt to show him that his beliefs are unreasonable is *idle*.

Another common way of dealing with radical doubts prevalent among Wittgenstein’s disciples was to show how, because indubitable propositions as “There are external objects”, “I have a body” or “The world didn’t come into being five seconds ago replete with apparent traces of a much more extended past” were in fact *grammatical rules*, *normative assertions* or *basic principles of inference* with the external (and misleading) appearance of factual reports (they belong to logic, not to science), both skeptics and Cartesian epistemologists were guilty of a disturbing category error. They deal with them as with propositions, looking for proofs or evidences, when, because they constitute the *props* of reason, they are beyond demonstration, doubt and truth-values. In other words, principles of inference are indemonstrable without begging the question, which doesn’t mean that they are doubttable: we only can question that which, in other cognitive position, we also could prove, that is, *empirical statements*. Logical rules are neither

16 L. Wittgenstein, 1969, *On Certainty* (Oxford: Blackwell 2004), § 359.

correct nor incorrect: they make possible to talk about right and wrong (from an epistemological point of view).

A nice shot, but is it accurate? Sosa doesn't think so. At least for two good reasons: (a) Because, apart from the funny ring of saying that "I have two hands" doesn't state a *real fact*, there is nothing which could prevent a norm to be also a statement, that is, nothing demonstrates that principles and propositions are *exclusive categories*. Wittgensteinian philosophers raise doubts over global scenarios because they generate intransigent disagreement (because they cannot be refuted). But intransigent disagreement is an indicator of "no fact of the matter" only in cases where if it were a fact of the matter it would be detectable (think on disagreement about culinary tastes, for instance), condition which is not met by global scenarios (they show that if it were a fact of the matter it would undetectable, forbidding the deduction from the last fact to the negation of the antecedent of the conditional). And, (b) because, since there is a sense of "proof" according to which something can be proved if we are compelled to assent it and if it is impossible to raise reasonable doubts over it, a sense which shows that *there are reasons which are not a form of evidence*<sup>17</sup>, it makes sense to ask if our principles of inference are true, namely, if they can be justified from an objective point of view.

Regarding the second point, Sosa thinks that Fogelin doesn't achieve his aim: to get as robust a skeptical challenge as one could like only through checkable but unchecked defeaters, that is to say, to raise eliminable doubts equally devastating than uneliminable global doubts.

In order to demonstrate this point it is enough to remember why Descartes *had to use* the dream hypothesis to extending skepticism: because there are "many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible...for instance, that I'm here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands."<sup>18</sup> It's quite evident that if I could doubt that this is my hand or that I'm writing this paper, my grounds to doubting *wouldn't be empirical conditions* which I have to eliminate in order to know, but a global scenario which, though maybe I could eliminate, I couldn't rule out appealing to data within its scope. In other words: there are *nuclear beliefs* beyond the scope of Pyrrhonian arguments, and thus, or this sort of skepticism is not radical enough or it must appeal to Cartesian scenarios in order to be so.

17 Cf. D. Davidson, 1983, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge", in: D. Davidson, 2006, *The Essential Davidson* (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press), p. 232.

18 C. Adam; P. Tannery, (eds.), 1904, *Oeuvres de Descartes. Meditations de Prima Philosophia (VII)* (Paris: J. Vrin 1996), p. 18.

On the other hand, Sosa criticizes Fogelin's skeptical arguments because, starting an *infinite regress* (there will be always a *new remote possibility* which must be defeated in order to achieve knowledge), they can't be ruled out, and thus, since Fogelin is tempted to equate a *reasonable* with an *indeterminate* (and, so-speaking, *groundless*) ground for doubting (the bare *possibility* of *unforeseen* defeaters would be enough to allow skepticism to get off the ground), because he is forgetting the first requirement that a reasonable doubt has to meet: to offer some conjectural *explanation* of how it is that we might erroneously believe the proposition which is being targeted by the argument we appeal to. In other words: *our grounds for doubting a proposition must be determinate*, namely, *real and rational possibilities according to our perspective in a particular context*. In this respect, Sosa is reminding us that Fogelin is overreaching the target of epistemology; that the epistemologist's goal is not to explain absolute knowledge, *but human knowledge*; and that this kind of knowledge requires (at a reflective level) only reasonable safety, not a failsafe guarantee. Obviously, this condition amounts to a *redirection* of epistemology (and to a restrictive version of the epistemologist's concerns): because *they are too remote (or too fuzzy) to be relevant to human beings and to human knowledge*, indeterminate grounds for doubting and hyperbolic scenarios of radical deception (the brain in the vat, Descartes' evil demon...) are ruled out.

This thesis notwithstanding, Sosa doesn't endorse a deflationary account of global scenarios. The demon scenario is *not* ruled out because global, but because it is too alien and unfamiliar. In this respect, Sosa's attitude to criticisms directed to Cartesian skepticism from semantic externalism (Putnam, Davidson, Nozick...) is precisely the opposite of Fogelin's. The latter, because if semantic externalism is true Cartesian scenarios are conceptually incoherent, established a sort of skepticism spared by this criticism. The first, because externalist's assumptions are too *controversial* and their arguments are too subtle and contentious, grants to Cartesian scenarios what may be called a *default competence*. These are *meaningful* hypotheses lacking any sign on the contrary. Thereby, if we are looking for a *presuppositionless (and, thus, definitive, incorrigible and invulnerable) escape from radical skepticism* we have to take global scenarios at face value. According to Sosa, externalism doesn't question Cartesian skepticism, but it is the *intuitive force* of the latter which makes semantic externalism deeply suspicious.

In short, one of the most important achievements of Ernest Sosa has been the reintroduction and the intellectual *rehabilitation* of Cartesian skepticism in contemporary epistemology. He has regained the epistemological tradition *for us*, keeping after the "linguistic turn" and after the "post-linguistic thaw" the indispensable "Cartesian touch", an unusual and valuable spirit which Sosa's aspirations make clear: he thinks that, despite the global character of his doubts,

he *can* eliminate them; and he hopes that, because he's going to deploy sweeping and general scenarios such that if a hypothesis of this kind is defeated that kind of hypothesis stays defeated, *certainty will come from doubt*. Why, if trying to leave behind global scenarios once they are tackled seriously is not good old Cartesian philosophy, what is?

Given this context, it is not strange the *significance* bestowed by Sosa on the dream argument. Unlike outlandish possibilities which might happen, but not easily, dreams are an ordinary part of our life, and thus, the dream scenario is *too close for comfort*<sup>19</sup>, too relevant to human knowledge. In other words, because the dream hypothesis (which might easily happens) makes our beliefs *unsafe* (or not reasonably safe), the first task of a virtue epistemology is to rule out this scenario. Only then our knowledge *will be possible*. Meanwhile both our animal knowledge (maybe the dream scenario makes also our beliefs *unapt*<sup>20</sup>) and our reflective knowledge are seriously threatened by this not-too-remote Cartesian possibility. Convinced that the argument is far better than its contemporary reputation and distrusting easy procedural objections, Sosa faces this challenge *directly*. He presents *two direct arguments* against this global scenario. Such is the importance of dreaming skepticism to Sosa that in *A Virtue Epistemology* three complete chapters are dedicated to this point-by-point rebuttal. Moreover, such is its significance that the new concepts of Sosa's virtue epistemology are introduced as *necessary means in order to clarify (and to solve afterwards) this skeptical problem*: the skeptical scenario, not the virtue epistemology, wears the trousers in the first volume of what might be Sosa's masterpiece.

Thanks to Ernest Sosa dreaming skepticism recovers its soundness and its intellectual respect, which, after all, means that his lasting lesson is to teach us how to regain *discomfort and disquiet in epistemology*. The significance of the dream scenario lies in its very possibility, that is to say, in the *nightmarish perspective* opened by that possibility. This means that, after all, philosophical responses to skepticism (like Sosa's) are sensible because *skeptical doubts are sensible*. Only because dreaming skepticism is a danger, it makes sense to try to reduce our exposure.

**4.** True enough. But maybe Sosa is over-reacting, maybe he is bestowing too much soundness and significance on a *secondary problem*. This suspicion

19 Cf. E. Sosa, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

20 Appealing to the distinction between the conditions that must be satisfied in order to *know* and the conditions which would make true that *we know that we know* (animal and reflective knowledge), this option is promptly rejected by Sosa. The proper target of the dream argument is *reflective knowledge*, apt belief aptly noted.

is closely related to what I'll call the *procedural objection* to his picture of the dream argument.

In order to explain this point it would be useful, first, to underline the two deepest differences between Fogelin and Sosa, and afterwards, to remember some aspects of the epistemological project proposed by Descartes. To be precise, I would like to explain the two axes on which Descartes can assess both skepticism and the traditional epistemological project, to draw some analogies between the strategy of Descartes' *Meditations* and Sosa's *reliabilism*, and, finally, to show what might be the *natural place* of external world skepticism in a reliabilist framework like Sosa's and Descartes'.

The first significant difference between Fogelin and Sosa concerns the *conditions of a reasonable doubt*. According to Fogelin, because it always makes sense to *imagine* (or, at least, to conceive the general possibility of coming to imagine) under which conditions a given proposition would be false, and thus, because it is thinkable to cast doubts over *every possible belief*, all our beliefs are *equal in kind and nature*. For a Pyrrhonist there are *no* hierarchies either in grammar or in philosophy and, hence, to assign a privileged status to certain propositions is not allowed. In contrast, Sosa accepts a kind of beliefs which are the natural and inescapable commitments which we neither choose nor could give up. These beliefs are different in nature from the rest of our propositions. They are the rules which we must take for granted in all our reasonings and which we simply *cannot help* believing, the propositions which we are compelled to believe. We do not know what it would be like for them to be false, or, better, we do not know what it would be like for their denials to be true (for example, I don't have any idea what it would be like for me to be *and* not to be writing this paper at the same moment and in the same place or for two plus two to be less than four); and thus, *ordinary doubts concerning these beliefs are humanly impossible and psychologically senseless*. These beliefs are what, borrowing from Descartes, I'll call *intuitions* (in other words, clear and distinct perceptions identified by our common incapacity to have *object-level doubts* concerning them). Rejection of this brute psychological fact is what makes untenable Fogelin's position. Obviously, to admit *unshakable convictions* doesn't entail to be committed to the controversial thesis that our unshakeable convictions are justified because unshakeable: neither Descartes nor Sosa are exponents of Peter Strawson's epistemological naturalism; they are not allured by an unacceptable position which conflates causal explanation and epistemic justification<sup>21</sup>.

21 Fogelin's rejection of hierarchies in the realm of beliefs is double. He rejects both rational intuitions and hinge-propositions, that is, basic perceptual beliefs which don't belong to the same

The second major disagreement between Fogelin and Sosa concerns *epistemic responsibility*. According to Fogelin, because we are *not* compelled to affirm any proposition, that is to say, because we *don't have to yield* to any inclination-to-believe, *responsibility for our errors is always ours*. Moreover, insofar as defeaters, although one-by-one eliminable, are uneliminable as a whole, all our (true or false) beliefs are unjustified, or, in other words, because “it is always by the grace of Nature that one knows something”<sup>22</sup>, whenever we judge we are *guilty* of irrationality, that is to say, independently of (accidentally) hitting the target of truth, we: natural epistemic wrongdoers, are responsible for being irresponsible. Fogelin thinks that *we can* and that *we must* resist epistemic dispositions, that *suspension of judgment* is the only rational attitude at our disposal; which means that in his epistemology there is no place for *apt beliefs*: because no cognitive performance might be absolutely adroit, nothing might be accurate because adroit. In short, failures are always creditable to the believer's incompetence, but correct answers never are creditable to his (nonexistent) competence.

Given this context, I want to pay attention to the Cartesian origins of the project taken over by Sosa's reliabilism: to provide “a satisfyingly general philosophical account of human knowledge”<sup>23</sup>. This project presupposes the distinction between at least two different kinds of beliefs: basic principles which must be warranted by the epistemologist and empirical propositions where disagreement about their truth and object-level doubting are permitted<sup>24</sup>.

In Descartes' *Meditations* there are *three kinds of beliefs* which require *three different forms of doubt*: (i) Doubts regarding *empirical propositions* are imaginable, easily produced and removed and seriously considered by the individual who, doubting that *p*, actually vacillates between affirmation and denial, incapable of believing *while doubting*. (ii) Doubts regarding a *belief which we are strongly inclined to affirm but whose falsehood is imaginable* are different in nature. In such a case, reasons for doubt are *too remote*, and thus, because we don't take them seriously enough, it is possible to conciliate our belief that

order of empirical propositions. Curiously, the last point entails that a self-proclaimed Wittgensteinian (Fogelin) doesn't accept the nuclear thesis defended by Wittgenstein in *On Certainty*.

22 Cf. L. Wittgenstein, 1969, *op. cit.*, § 505.

23 E. Sosa, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

24 Obviously, this doesn't imply that in the realm of perceptual beliefs we couldn't distinguish between propositions where an empirical doubt is possible (empirical propositions) and propositions which are immune to empirical error (hinge-beliefs). In this context, we are contrasting the empirical as the area where a doubt (either empirical or global) is imaginable, with the rational as the proper place of Cartesian thoughts, thoughts that we cannot attempt to doubt without immediately discovering the doubt to be at a methodological or phenomenological level unintelligible.

$p$  and the fact that we have doubts about  $p$ : we believe with reservations that  $p$ . Anyway, because the will is not forced by the understanding to affirm these propositions, they are not compulsions. This is the place reserved by Descartes for particular perceptual propositions stated in unbeatable circumstances and for beliefs concerning the existence of the external world, beliefs which only might be false *under global hypotheses as the dream scenario*. (iii) Finally, *intuitions*, that is, simple and evident truths whose falsehood is inconceivable, cannot be coherently denied, questioned or doubted.

Obviously, because Descartes' objective is to *justify* our reliance on rational intuitions; to demonstrate that our rational minds are reliable instruments for the detection of truth; that *reason is capable of self-validation* without appealing (with vicious circularity) to our reliance on reason's deliverances; or, in other words, because Descartes' main question is: *can we rely on our intuitions?*; he manages to show that a general overthrow and justification of our cognitive capacities and the intuitions yielded by them makes sense without having to reject what seems obviously true: that we are unable to imagine a doubt concerning them.

In this respect, Descartes raises *meta-level doubts* asking if our compulsions *could be false* to God or to an angel, that is to say, if they might be, absolutely speaking, from the perspective of a pure enquirer or from the point of view from nowhere, false<sup>25</sup>. These theoretical doubts are enough *to questioning the epistemic authority of intuitions without compromising their psychological power*. They explain the epistemological importance of the Evil Demon hypothesis (a mere opinion concerning the possibility of a omnipotent deceiver capable to producing a *poorly designed instrument* for the detection of truth, namely, the human reason); the role played by the demon's advocate (a fictional character who, sane, shares our intuitions without sharing our unwarranted intellectual reliance on them) in the strategy of Descartes' *Meditations*; and the reliabilist procedures which Descartes, unable to add support to his intuitions and forced to try to subtract grounds for doubting them, has to apply in order to rule out an as *remote as epistemologically relevant scenario*.

In fact, anticipating contemporary *reliabilism*, Descartes *replaces the center of epistemology*. There is a way of overcoming skepticism without a vicious circle. Instead of validating our rational power before using it, we might *take*

25 An analogous distinction can be found in *On Certainty*, the last collection of remarks written by Wittgenstein. Concerning hinge-propositions, that is, propositions which we cannot help to believe, he wrote: "What is odd is that in such a case I always feel like saying (although it is wrong): "I know that—so far as one can know such a thing." That is incorrect, but something right is hidden behind it." L. Wittgenstein, 1969, *op. cit.*, § 623.

*conditionally for granted* the results yielded by that faculty, and if *it is capable of validating itself*, that is to say, if following reason we come to demonstrate a *theory on how things in fact are in the world which precludes the unreliability of one's faculties*, then, because *reason is capable of providing its rational validation*, skepticism would be overcome. The important thing is to have a *world view* capable of providing an explanatory account of how we acquire our beliefs and a *metaphysical or ontological warrant* of them (this role is played in Descartes's philosophy by the benevolent God whose veracity guarantees knowledge, but it might be played by the rational God-Nature which, according to Spinoza, backs both our reason and our perceptions). In any case, because the *mere opinions* which made general skepticism reasonable before reason's self-validation *would be irrational from this enlightened perspective*, global scenarios would be *cognitively defective* and irrelevant. The significance of global scenarios is *context-dependent*, which means that, once raised the epistemic bet, their effectiveness cannot be taken for granted.

Anyway, consider the scale provided by Descartes: increase in *epistemological relevance* is directly proportional to decrease in *practical significance*. In other words, to display too much closeness is not the best way to enticing an epistemologist.

5. To recap: against the background just outlined, what might be wrong in Sosa's conception of the dream argument?

(i) Sosa uses this scenario in order to establish a new version of the *Cogito*. He argues in three steps: (a) Dreams sever the relation between our beliefs and their truth, namely, between what is happening *in* the dream and what is the real case *while* we dream; so that if I could be dreaming that *p*, *p* might be false. (b) He extends this capacity of dreams for *bracketing reality* to the reality of mental processes (beliefs, meanings, reasonings...); so that if I could be dreaming that I think that *p*, the *thought* which is the intentional object of my dream might be unreal and thereby false. (c) But mental life is *incorrigible*, which means that, because I'm certain of my belief that *p*, I cannot be dreaming: I'm compelled to affirm both that I'm thinking and that I'm not dreaming; I came to see that when I judge that I'm awake I have an *intuition*. In Sosa's words: "We can just as well affirm <I think, therefore I am awake> as <I think, therefore I am>."<sup>26</sup>

Nevertheless, the *Cogito* does not refute the skeptic, nor does it escape the scope of the most extreme skeptical doubt. In other words, because the general epistemological project tackled by reliabilism attempts to warrant intuitions,

26 E. Sosa, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

deployment of evidences and intuitions in order to overcome skeptical scenarios or to get certainties is forbidden, on pain of falling into one of the traps of *circularity, infinite regress or arbitrary assumption*. Once were warranted that whatever we intuit is true (intuition as criterion of certainty) and were demonstrated (if possible) that we can't resist to believe that physical objects exist, this argument might be sound. Meanwhile (or better: independently of such a metaphysical perspective), because our intuitions might be massively false, they are defective tools in the quest of certainty.

(ii) Sosa's argument is also open to a crushing Procedural Objection: if the conclusion were true he could not assert its premise. According to Sosa, the significance of this particular global hypothesis comes from the fact that *it might happen too easily*, that is to say, it seems logically involved in the requirement of *reasonable safety* for ordinary human knowledge. However, what his argument comes to conclude is that *our natural vision of the cognitive role played by dreams is wrong*, and therefore, that we cannot imagine the possibility of dreaming while thinking. Thus, dreams are quite another thing than *remote* possibilities: belonging to the realm of *sensitivity*, they aren't even logical possibilities. In short, the Cartesian argument cannot be at the same time significant in ordinary contexts and incoherent.

Of course, Sosa might reply reminding us that he is using the argument like a *ladder-language* in order to get an enlightened and improved perspective on dreams; but his insistence in warranting reasonable safety and in recommending to sidestep sensitivity seems to suggest that, after the argument, he still judges dreams as possibilities; very remote, but conceivable ones. This is why Sosa's conceptual treatment of dreams looks ambiguous to me.

(iii) Apart from this, I don't think that the thesis according to which the target-belief of the dream scenario: the external world's existence, is an intuition whose denial is unthinkable, could be seriously hold without a strong commitment to semantic externalism and to transcendental arguments (arguments logically related to ultra-rationalist conceptions of the relation between reason and experience) as Davidson's, both positions explicitly rejected by Sosa. I don't know what it would be like for two plus two to be less than four, but I can think of a state of affairs where a person's sensory stimulations could be just as they are and yet they could be created directly by God (consider Berkeley). The common sense hypothesis is the best explanation of our perceptions and we share a strong disposition to assert it, but the point of global scenarios is, precisely, to show that explanations alternative to the common sense narrative are conceivable. Appealing to our common intuitions, we refuse to classify beliefs concerning the external world as intuitions. Ironically, these very intuitions are the starting point of Sosa's refutation.

(iv) Finally, I want to stress that when Sosa suggests that epistemology must deal with skeptical possibilities according to their relevance to *human knowledge*, he means two different things, one quite correct, the second, at odds with the project of a general understanding of human knowledge. On the one hand, he is meaning that global scenarios are context-dependent, that is to say, that, because we are able to acquire a cognitive position where global hypotheses which made sense in previous circumstances come to be considered as *senseless*, skepticism's reasonability can't be asserted *abstracting from what one knows or ignores about the world*. In this sense, the epistemologist does not face bare possibilities, but possibilities according to epistemic variations. On the other hand, with "relevance to human knowledge" he means "practical significance". But that which is uninspiring for the ordinary man is the main theme for the epistemologist, who deals with intuitions and foundations. This means that, contrary to Sosa's opinion in *A Virtue Epistemology* but in agreement with the requirements of his general reliabilism, the dream argument is not relevant to epistemology because it is too close for comfort, but because *it is distant enough from ordinary standards to be close enough to foundations*. Reliabilism must face the problem of external world, but *not before* validating intuitions. In other words: neither sensitivity nor serious danger, are proper of strong dispositions.

## 6. One final point.

Although a internal analysis of Sosa's anti-skeptical argument would require a detailed reflection beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to mention three possible problems: (i) Because its main thesis (that we cannot be thinking while dreaming) only can be defended assuming an *external* and *third person* point of view deeply linked to extreme versions of semantic verificationism and easily counter-balanced by intuitions rendered by an *internal* or *first person* perspective; the argument is based in an unsolvable conflict of intuitions, so that it results in a stand-off. (ii) Even if we accept the connection between casting doubts over perceptual knowledge and giving up meanings and beliefs, Sosa cannot invoke the meaningfulness of language as the guarantor of truth. In other words, because the interrelation between truth and meaning, if correct, instead of warranting truth, undermines meaning, that is to say, because the argument points out that my knowledge that I'm in this room and the understanding of the meaning of this sentence stand or fall together, it *extends*, not *refutes*, an object-level skepticism. (iii) Over all, paying attention to the dream argument, and not to its target-belief; Sosa's analysis might blur the *real problem* behind the Cartesian scenario: the non-compulsory character of beliefs referred to the external world, beliefs which can be construed *non-epistemically* and which point to the possibility of a divorce between the thinker and his ordinary beliefs, that is to say, between the *empirical subject* who is entertaining such beliefs and the *enquirer* who is treat-

ing his own mental contents as if they were the mental contents of someone else, someone entertaining beliefs within him.

What I'm trying to say is:

(i) If reason cannot make sense of experience, then is there a sense according to which we can detach ourselves from our conception of the world and still preserving our capacity of judgment<sup>27</sup>. In this respect, Sosa's overstated the link between basic perceptual beliefs and rationality, falling into an *ultra-rationalism* of sorts which is at odds with the reliabilist project of *self-validating reason*. One thing is to say that the epistemological perspective deprives us of the *intimate dimension* which distinguishes our experience of the world from abstract thought, namely, that, since the epistemologist sees his experiences *from the outside*, treating his own sensations as if they were the sensations of someone else, he is making of the second-person common world a riddle or puzzle, something strange, alien, uninformative and insignificant; and quite another to state that he lacks a perspective. Because it is *possible*, rational detachment is a threat to the meaning of our lives. Madness is equivalent to splendid isolation. To be faithful to the irreducible character of experience implies to acknowledge the divide between two kinds of sense: sense from the outside and sense from the inside. The tension between these two primitive standpoints explains both our discomfort in epistemology and our incapacity to get rid of it.

(ii) Reliabilism requires raising the *skeptical problem* at a higher level and under different (and stricter) conditions. As a matter of fact, it entails to raise two related questions: (a) Is it possible to construe the laws of thought epistemically without making of them something necessary? (b) How to make sense of the *dual nature* of human beings, of the fact that we can divorce ourselves from our beliefs and still feel that we are intimately related to them, when close connection is *unintelligible* from a rational point of view and when detachment seems impossible from the common sense perspective? That is to say: how is it possible for a being to entertain beliefs and to be rational?

The contingency of rational principles and the skeptical thesis according to which there are *paradoxes internal to reason* which, showing that rationality is self-refuting and that its deliverances could be *non-epistemic* in character,

<sup>27</sup> Sosa shows his commitment to an epistemological conception of reason when, in spite of the remote possibility of dreams, he proposes a transcendental argument in order to demonstrate the *cogito*. If the argument is cogent, the dream argument is *a priori* incapable to cast doubts over the deliverances of reason. If dreams question the *cogito* itself, then the transcendental argument cannot rule out the possibility of dreaming, and hence it is useless in order to demonstrate the *cogito*. Sosa faces a *dilemma*: either total skepticism or the rejection of the thesis according to which dreaming and thinking are *exclusive* categories, that is, the rejection of the *imagination model of dreams*.

undermine its authority, hold the first question. The irreducible and non-epistemic character of our beliefs and the requirement of making some sense of them from the outside, hold the second question. They can be neither *repressed* nor *answered* appealing to the last authority of the logical framework. Moreover, they point to the *same kind of answer*: a procedure capable of validating reason and experience without making of the laws of thought the *criterion* of the endless possible worlds, that is to say, a strategy capable of providing a rational basis to experience without exhausting experience, and so without falling into the ultra-rationalist ideal of reducing the universe to a mathematical formula.

In a nutshell: what is required is a *ground for groundlessness* capable to preserve this groundlessness and still to make veridical our fundamental convictions, a point which, reached by reason, could be the ground which makes sense of the creative, irreducible and indeterminate aspects of reality. Brute facts, because of their contingency, are not candidates for the role of self-grounded ground. Nomological principles from which each and every detail of the world could be deduced are *incompatible with contingency*. The conciliation of experience and rationality, of contingency and necessity, is only possible in *God*, a being who makes sense of an *iterative conception of modality* according to which necessary truths about contingently existing beings are only contingently necessary, but necessary truths about necessarily existing beings are necessarily necessary.

Since God can be *touched by reason*, but not fully grasped, He is the point where reasons come to an end *in agreement with reason*, that is to say, where, since it is reason itself which comes to conclude that there are aspects of the world which are not understandable, the limits of reason are not its *limitations*, and so the thirst for more reasons is quenched, but not repressed. Since God, although rational in a sense, is not bound by our particular way of thinking, everything which is conceivable it is also possible, but the possible is not reduced to the conceivable. Since He is the only object whose demonstration is capable to break without circularity the *balance of judgments* brought about by skeptical scenarios which undermine the authority of reason (while after the *Cogito* the skeptic could coherently point to the Demon Scenario for balancing judgments, he couldn't do the same after the demonstration of God, since *at that stage* this option is not a possibility; in other words, unlike the case of the *Cogito*, where the skeptic can give his assent both to the *Cogito* argument and to the skeptical possibility, he cannot assent to the demonstration of God without rejecting his previous arguments: this is the reason why if the proofs of God are hypothetically valid they are, from an absolute point of view, correct), his demonstration is irreplaceable in epistemology.

God is the right expression for *the foundation of the lack of foundation* which the epistemological and detached perspective on our empirical selves

holds. Reasons come to an end only when reason touches something which cannot be grasped. Groundlessness has to be grounded in order to avoid arbitrariness and wishful thinking.

Sosa's analysis is guided by a correct and deep insight: that, because global scenarios imply a *complete rejection of foundationalism and evidentialism*, they only might be overcome once were demonstrated that our minds are reliable instruments for the detection of truth, that is, once our intuitions were warranted. As far as it goes, this is true. Nevertheless, whether the validation of reason is required to ruling out the dream scenario is one thing; whether it is the same to validate reason and to demonstrate an external world is quite another. Beyond intuitions there is no space for absolute safety.

Sosa is a Cartesian, but dealing with dreams he is not *Cartesian enough*. In other words, replacing metaphysics by epistemology and an enlightened perspective on the world by the evidence of a new *Cogito*, he is inviting back the old ghosts of Chilsohm's subjective foundationalism: the very ghosts that Sosa knows full well how to exorcize.

MODESTO M. GÓMEZ ALONSO

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