

SUAREZ ON THE EXTERNALITY AND INTERNALITY OF RELATIONS

The early twentieth century conflict between British realism and post-Hegelian idealism resulted in a spirited but today almost forgotten debate on the internality or externality of relation¹. Although couched in a peculiar terminology, the debate was basically a confrontation between an empiricist and a rationalist theory of knowledge as they both bear upon the philosophically central problem of relations.

The claim that all relations are external was generally understood to mean that the related terms are not what are in virtue of their being related to each other. Classical empiricism, as tentatively formulated by Locke and radically presented by Hume, proceeded on the assumption that the task of philosophy is not to unveil the true nature of things but rather to describe the way they are experienced by minds. Empiricists, for the most part, assumed also that the data of experience are critically perceived as isolated units and only later related to one another by a subsequent and active operation of the mind. Relations are not given in experience but arise from an imaginative articulation of the material passively received through the senses. Even those relations which, as Hume says, «depend entirely upon the ideas themselves», are «external» in the sense that they are not components of the reality we perceive but rather the ingredients of our manner of perceiving reality. Hume invited the extreme conventionalism and instrumentalism of some contemporary analytic philosophers by denying also that particulars are ontological bearers of properties. The relation between a particular and its properties becomes «external» in the stronger sense that particulars themselves are nothing but bundles of perceptions put together according to the way our experience is shaped by the sentiments, forces, and habits of the perceiving mind. Contemporary analytic philosophers merely translate Hume into linguistic terms. A given description of a given particular is never privileged or revealing, but always logically arbitrary and conditioned by the interests and purposes of those who make the description. Even the common sense and Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental properties is given a pragmatic character without any ontological or «internal» justification.

The counterclaim that all relations are internal roughly meant that the related terms are what they are in virtue of their being related to

¹ The controversy and related bibliography are well presented by R. M. Rorty in 'Relations, Internal and External', *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, P. Edwards ed. (New York 1967).

one another. The claim is itself internally related to the fundamental postulate of rationalistic philosophers who either demand a perfect parallelism of thought and reality, or identify one with the other (rationalistic idealism). The radical conclusions of this Parmenidian and Platonic way of thinking were formulated with cogent clarity in the seventeenth century by Leibniz' teaching that all truths are analytical truths and by Spinoza's assimilation of causal to logical relations. Rationalistic idealism found its most comprehensive and systematic expression in Hegel's philosophical system. Hegel's concrete universal fuses into one the abstract and the particular, thought and being. The concrete universal is the all-inclusive interrelated system of particulars lined to each other by the very necessity of rational thought.

Hegelian idealism inspired the thesis of the internality of all relations which was first proposed by T. H. Green toward the end of the nineteenth century and discussed in a thorough manner by Royce, Bosanquet, and especially by Bradley in *Appearance and Reality* (1893). Bradley's ideas were given eloquent expression by B. Blanshard in his classic *The Nature of Thought* (1939)². Blanshard refuted the modern empiricism of J. S. Mill in a way similar to that of Green, but with stronger emphasis upon judgement. Even the judgement of recognition which follows sensation is the recognition of a relation between a universal and its particular instance. All human reflection is «a response to the challenge of fragmented experience»³. The «theoretical impulse» and the «immanent end of thought» is to proceed from the part to the whole toward an ever increasing understanding of context which culminates in the grasp of the inalterable order of relations that makes possible the intelligibility of the universe⁴.

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The purpose of this paper is to present Suárez' thought on relations and its implications upon the modern debate on their internality or externality. More specifically, we shall argue: 1) that Suárez' distinction between real relations and relations of reason amounts to a rejection of empiricist phenomenalism and pragmatism by asserting the «internal» and real character of some relations; 2) that Suárez' distinction between transcendental and predicamental relations reinforces the common sense distinction between essential and accidental properties which idealism tends to negate; and, finally, 3) that Suárez' detailed and subtle analysis of all relations does more justice to the complex character of relations than the crude and simplistic dichotomy of internal and external relations⁵.

² T. H. Green's views are presented in his *Introduction to Hume's Treatise on Human Nature* (1874) and his posthumously published *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883).

³ *The Nature of Thought*, II, 47.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 489-90.

⁵ The references to Suárez' *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (henceforth DM) include the number of each *disputatio* in Latin numerals, followed by the number of the

The phenomenalist character of the empiricist theory about the externality of all relations leads to a radical psychologism and instrumentalism which is obviously incompatible with the ontological realism of Aristotelian metaphysics as presented by Suárez. As a true Aristotelian, Suárez considered relations not a links between ideas or inclinations of our minds, but rather as aspects of reality itself. As such, real relations ought to be clearly distinguished from mental fabrications which might be founded upon reality but follow rather than precede the operation of the mind. Real relations exist in reality itself (*in rebus ipsis existunt*, DM XLVII, 1, 13), prior to and independently from any fiction of the intellect (*absque ulla fictione intellectus*, *Ibid.*) Two white walls, for example, are not similar because we think they are similar, but rather the opposite: we think they are similar because they *are* similar. There is, however, another manner of conceiving reality which imitates our perception of relations between things, a manner which Suárez calls «relations of reason only» (*relationes rationis tantum*, DM XLVII, 3, 2). These relations are not real entities, but only «beings of reason» (*entia rationis tantum*) or «fictions of the intellect» (*per intellectum conficta*, *Ibid.*). In the relations of reason the intellect does not discover a connection between two things, such as the relation of resemblance between two white walls, but rather imitates that manner of perception «by a mental operation through which one thing is compared with another». Relations of reason are not the direct object of metaphysical inquiry, but like other *entia rationis*, indirectly belong to it in that, by contrast, they help to understand the nature of real relations.

Suárez' classification of relations of reason is presented in the following diagram:

section and the paragraph in Arabic numerals. I have used the Spanish-Latin edition prepared by S. Rábade, S. Caballero and A. Puigcerver (Madrid, 1964). Although this article deals exclusively with Suárez' thought, the reader might consult the following bibliography for a general study on relations before Suárez: C. Cavnos, *The Classical Theory of Relations* (Belmont, Mass. 1975), particularly the chapter on Thomism (67-103); J. R. Weinberg, *Abstraction, Relation and Induction* (Milwaukee 1965), particularly the section on «Medieval Views» (86-112); A. Krempel, *La Doctrine de la Relation chez S. Thomas* (Paris 1952) and 'S. Thomas et la notion de relation transcendente', *Révue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques*, 43 (1975) 135-42; M. D. Philippe, 'La notion de relation transcendente, est elle Thomiste?', *ibid.*, 42 (1958) 265-75; A. Horwarth, *Metaphysik der Relationen* (Graz 1914); and N. A. Nikam, 'On the nature of relations', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 13 (1937) 35-45. Probably the most authoritative source on Suárez' theory of relations is J. Hellín, 'Esencia de la relacion predicamental según Suárez', *Las Ciencias*, 23 (1958) 648-97, and 'Relaciones divinas y principio de identidad comparada', *Espiritu* 24 (1975) 135-42. See also, J. P. Burns, 'Action in Suárez', *New Scholasticism*, 37 (1964) 453-72; F. García y Martínez, 'El sentido de la realidad en la metafísica Suareziana', *Miscelánea Comillas*, 9 (1948) 309-22.

Relations of Reason	}	Logical Relations	Between subject and predicate Between <i>definiens</i> and <i>definiendum</i> Between premises and conclusion Among the five <i>predicabilia</i>
			Relations between actually existent and possible things
			Relations of self-identity
			Relations between the term of a non-mutual real relation to the subject of such relation

Logical relations are not real relations because at least one of the terms is not a particular existent thing but a universal concept. The relation between an actually existent thing and a non actually existent or possible being cannot be real because, as we shall see later, both the term and the subject of the relation are indispensable to the reality of the relation itself (DM XLVII, 8, 8-14). The relation of self-identity is not a real relation because such relation results from a comparing act of the intellect by which one thing is compared to itself *as if* they were two extremes» (*ac si essent duo extrema*, DM XLVII, 9, 6). The relation between the object known and the cognition itself is also a relation of reason by which we explain to ourselves the non mutual and real relation of cognition to its object. That which is known is not really altered in any way by being known, but rather the cognition itself is measured and oriented toward its object. In other words, the object known is not really related to the knowing subject; but the relation of the cognitive act to its object is explained by our mind through a relation of reason which portrays the object as the correlative of the cognitive act (*mens nostra ad explicandam relationem illam quam scientia ipsa habet ad ipsum scibile concipit ut correlativum scientiae*, DM XLVII, 155, 13). In this case, therefore the intellect does not discover a relation between two realities but rather feigns a relation which helps us to understand the real relation of cognition to its object.


External denominations (*denominationes extrinsecae*) and connotative terms share some similarities with relations of reason, but are also different from them in some respects. «To be known» and «to be loved» can be understood not only as the correlatives of the acts of knowing and loving (a relation of reason), but also «exclusively as terms and in an almost passive sense» (*mere terminative et quasi passive*, DM XLVII, 15, 13) by an external denomination derived from their corresponding act. Connotative terms are probably called by Suárez «relations by a manner of speaking» (*relationes secundum dici*, DM XLVII, 3) and denote absolute realities which nevertheless cannot be conceived by our limited minds «without another», such as the conception of God as «Creator».

All the relations of reason could be called «external» to the related

terms except for the logical relations, which could be called «internal» in a rather peculiar sense. This actually existent world is not what it is in virtue of our capacity to think of it as either better or worse than another possible world which has never existed nor will ever exist but which we can imagine or think about. A particular thing is not what it is because our minds are capable of comparing it with itself and recognizing its self-identity. An object known or loved is not what it is because our cognition or our love is commensurate to it. And, in general, relations of reason are external to reality because they are the result of thought processes which reality does not compel us to engage in and which do not affect the nature of real things in any accidental or essential manner.

Logical relations, however, could be called «internal» if they are considered in themselves and in abstraction from their ontological counterparts. Obviously, two different specific concepts are not what they are in virtue of our intellectual capacity to understand both of them at a higher level of abstraction under one generic concept. Still, the relations between specific and generic concepts, between different generic concepts, or between similar specific concepts—to give a few examples—could be called internal in the sense that as abstract universals or as terms of second intention, they are constituted and defined by their own ideational content.

The difference between real relations and relations of reason is not yet enough to call all real relations «internal» in exactly the same sense. In order to proceed carefully, Suárez begins by making a basic distinction of all real relations into transcendental and predicamental relations. Transcendental relations, although real, do not belong to any given predicament, but transcend and probably permeate all the predicaments (*per omnia vagantur*, DM XLVII, 3, 10). Substances have a transcendental relation to accidents, and accidents are defined by their capacity to inhere in a substance. Matter exists for the sake of form, and form for the sake of the matter it modifies and for the sake of the composite it helps to constitute in its being. Potencies are ordained to their acts, and acts have an essential reference to their object. All finite and created beings have a transcendental relation to the *Ens a se* from which they essentially depend. All these relations can be comprehended in the following diagram:



All these relations are real since they are not the consequence of our manner of thinking. On the contrary, our thought finds these essential links between finite beings as the very form by which they are constituted. Transcendental relations are not contingent and accidental forms by which entities already constituted in their specific nature are referred to others by those changeable, secondary, and individual traits which make up the «circumstantial order of the universe» (*ex ordine universi qui est accidentarium quid rebus ipsis absolutis quibus constat universonum*, DM XLVII, 1, 14). On the contrary, transcendental relations are «true, real, and essential references» (*Inter se veram et realem habitudinem essentialiter inclusam*, DM XLVII, 3, 11) which belong to the very definition of all finite beings, by which they are constituted in their essence and given a peculiar task (*peculiare munus*) in the realm of finite beings.

The transcendental-predicamental distinction gives a sharper edge to the traditionally Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental properties, a distinction backed by common sense and deeply ingrained in ordinary linguistic usage. Transcendental relations do not constitute the specific and much less the individual characteristics of a given thing, but they essentially determine the ontological status of finite beings as either substances or accidents, matter or form, potencies or acts, acts or objects. The transcendental relation of causal dependence separates and essentially characterizes the domain of finite and contingent being. Suárez, however, hesitates in claiming that all complete, created substantial beings have an essential reference to other beings besides their transcendental referenc to God (DM XLVII, 3, 10 and 12).

As real, all transcendental relations are «internal» to the related terms. A creature is a creature in virtue of its causal dependence from the First Cause. Such relation is not added to its being, but constitutes its very being. But transcendental relations are «internal» in a peculiar and exclusive sense. They are not «internal» because they constitute the specific nature or individual traits of a finite being, but rather because they differentiate finite from infinite being and because they assign to a certain kind of being or components of being a proper task within the finite realm.

The characteristic internality of transcendental relations is better understood by its contrast with the different degress of internality among predicamental relations are real, they antecede any activity of the perceiving mind. But, unlike transcendental relations, predicamental relations are accidents whose entire being (*totum esse*, DM LXVII, 5, 2) consists in being «toward other» (*ad aliud esse*, *Ibid.*), in «looking toward something else» (*ad aliud respicere*, *Ibid.*). In spite of its obvious but unavoidable circularity, this definition of predicamental relations excludes both the relations of reason which are not part of the real world and the transcendental relations whose being does not consist *entirely* in referring one thing to another.

Suárez' theory of predicamental relations is part of his metaphysical theory of predicaments in general, a theory he discusses in DM XXXII on the division of finite being into substance and accident, in DM XXXVII

on accident in general, and in DM XXXIX on the division of accident into nine categories. The division of finite being into substance and accident is characterized by Suárez as «more convenient to secure an orderly presentation of metaphysical doctrine» than the division of being into the ten Aristotelian categories, first because it is based upon «our constant experience of change» (*ex ipsa continua rerum mutatione*, DM XXXII, 1, 4) and also because it divides the realm of finite beings into more contrasting and clearly defined sub-domains than any other alternative division, such as that between potential and actual being, absolute and relative being.

Suárez begins his discussion of accidental being by reminding the reader that the term «accident» can be used in three different ways: as a logical term of second intention to describe a manner of predication; as a physical entity different from and affecting a substance; and as a predicament. The first usage belongs to the repertoire of the logician. Metaphysicians deal with the second and the third, both of which differ significantly in extension. All physical accidents are predicamental accidents, but not every predicamental accident is a physical accident. Physical accidents, either absolute (such as quantity or quality) or merely modal (such as figure) can be comprehended under a single and univocal objective concept (DM XXXVII, 1, 5); predicamental accidents, on the other hand, cannot be comprehended under a single concept (*in tota sua latitudine ...non potest habere unum conceptum objectivum*, DM XXXVII, 2, 7), but include external denominations, physical accidents and modes. All of them are still called «accidents» by some analogy of proportion in the sense that all of them modify substantial being in ways «which imitate in some contingent manner» (DM XXXIX, 3, 12) the way physical accidents change the denominations of the subject in which they inhere. For this reason Suárez believed that the division of finite being into substance and accident should precede the division of accident into nine categories, a procedure which has the clear advantage of bypassing the well-known objection that the Aristotelian categories tend to conceal the fundamental difference between the first and the rest of the predicaments.

Nevertheless, Suárez is still eager to prove that the division of predicamental accidents into nine categories, one of which is relation, is both irreducible to fewer members and adequate. The proof is neither from authority nor *a priori*, but rather based upon experience. «We do not experience more kinds of being, and the ones we experience appear to us as primarily different from each other and displaying no generic convenience among themselves» (DM XXXIX, 2, 18).

The most characteristic feature of Suárez' theory of predicamental being is his insistence on claiming that the division of predicamental accident into nine different categories is not based upon a real distinction, not even a modal one, between them and the substance they modify or between two different categories. Action and passion are neither really different from each other nor from the active principle (DM XLIX, 1). Duration is not really different from that which persists through time (DM L, 1) nor time is really different from motion (DM L, 9). The division


of accidents into nine categories is sufficiently based upon a distinction of reason with a fundament in reality. The categories of accidental being are real not because they denote nine different entities, but because they are nine different manners of predicating about substance. Such difference in predication, however, is not based upon a fiction of the intellect, but is imposed upon the intellect by the very nature of reality. Suárez's distinction of reason with a foundation in reality provides the clue to an eclectic theory of relations which avoids both the excesses of Platonic realism and the defects of Ockhamistic nominalism. Predicamental relations are real not because they are really different from the subject or the foundation of the relation, but because the subject and the term, in virtue of the foundation in the subject, stand to each other in such a way that our minds are compelled to make a distinction between them and their being related to each other. Suárez agrees with the nominalists in rejecting Scotus' teaching that relations are really different from the subject, the term and their foundation in the subject: «entities should not be distinguished and multiplied without necessity and sufficient reason» (DM XLVII, 2, 14). Not even God can prevent two white walls from being similar if nothing exists in the universe besides the two walls and their respective quality of whiteness. The fact that the relation ceases to exist if the term of the relation disappears (one of the walls), does not prove that the relation is really different from either wall and their white accidents, but proves only that «the term itself concurs in some necessary way to the completion of a relative denomination» (*quod ipse terminus aliquo modo concurrit vel necessarius est ad complendam talem denominationem*, DM XLVII, 2, 16). Nor is the relation itself to be identified with the foundation of the relation (the whiteness in the walls), which foundation does not need to be really different from the subject or from the term of relation. Two numerically different substances of the same species by themselves (their specific nature) are the foundation for the predicamental relation of specific similarity (DM LXVII, 7, 5). Whether the foundation of the relation is really different from the subject (as is the case in relations based upon quantity or quality), or merely different from the substance by a mental distinction founded in reality (as in the case of specific similarity) the relation itself is not identical with its foundation, but rather «emanates» from it (*pullulat*, DM XLVII, 2, 16) whenever the term is actually present. This does not mean that relations are nothing real or that they are only «external denominations». On the contrary, predicamental relations are «intrinsic forms» (*forma intrinseca*) which connote an external form in the term. The actual coexistence of the term is absolutely required for the predicamental relation to be real because «the very being and essence of such relation» (*esse et essentia huius relationis*, DM LXVII, 8, 7) consists exclusively in a pure reference of something to another and has absolutely no other purpose and task in reality. It is also worth noticing that transcendental relations sometimes require also the actual existence of a term, not because that is part of their definition, but rather because of the particular circumstances of some of those relations. The relation of intuition to its object, the relation of union to its terms, and

the relations between action and passion are transcendental but require an actually existent term.

Relations are not something which accidentally result from what nature primarily intended. The foundation of the relation must nevertheless be really different from its term since «nothing is opposed to itself» (*non opponitur idem sibi ipsi*, DM XLVII, 9, 3), except in the relation of self-identity, which for that very reason is not real but based upon a fiction of the intellect.

The reality of the predicamental relation requires that the relation be one (*unum per se*), rather «an aggregate of several predicaments» (*aggregata ex formis plurium predicamentorum*, DM XXXIX, 2, 34). Although mutual relations exist both in the subject and in the term, and can properly be said to exist between the subject and the term, the reality of the relation proceeds exclusively from the reality of its foundation (given an actually existent term). The foundation of a relation can be immediate and remote. The predicamental relation of equality is immediately grounded upon the accident of quantity, a remotely upon the substance affected by that quantity. The predicamental relation of accidental similarity is immediately grounded upon the accidental quality, remotely upon the unity in such quality, and even more remotely upon the substance affected by the same quality.

Suárez divides all predicamental relations according to the different foundation in as far as they also imply different terms (DM XLVII, 10, 14). Such division, like the division of accidental predicaments into nine different categories, is the result of an induction rather than a deduction from a *a priori* principle (DM XLVII, 10, 16). The following diagram presents Suárez' classification of predicamental relations:



The first kind of predicamental relations includes those based upon unity (or its contrary) in quality, quantity and substantial perfection. Two or more substances having the same quality (whiteness), the same quality in different degress, or different qualities, are mutually related

by the relations of similarity and dissimilarity. Two or more substances having the same or different quantity are mutually related by the relations of equality and inequality. The relations of similarity and equality (and their opposites) have one common characteristic: they are both based upon a physical accident which, according to Suárez, is really different from the substance in which it inheres. Predicamental relations based upon the unity (or lack of it) of substantial perfection, on the other hand, are not based upon a physical entity different from the substance itself, but rather upon a universal concept abstracted by the mind from their common natures. How can a relation between two realities be real when it is not based upon anything really different from the terms of the relation and itself is nothing really existent apart from the entities of the related terms? The difference between relations based upon either quantity or quality on one hand, and relations based upon the identity or distinction between their substantial natures seems, however, to be less significant when we consider that all of these relations presuppose a universal concept abstracted by the mind from two or more actually existent particulars, be they two qualities of whiteness, two quantities, or two substances of the same species.

Relations based upon unity include also relations based upon de unity (or difference) of two or more particular substances with respect to other predicaments. Two men who are fathers are similar to each other by being both related to their offspring by the same relation of paternity (DM XLVII, 11, 11). Nor can it be objected that in this case relations could be multiplied *ad infinitum*. Two paternities are related to each other by a different relation of similarity, but two relations of similarity are related to each other by themselves and no different relation results from them (DM XLVII, 11, 12).

In discussing the relations based upon action and passion, Suárez was very careful to distinguish the real relations based upon past or present actions from the relation of reason based upon causes and their potential but not yet existent activities. Relations based upon past experiences are real as long as the causes and their effects are still actually existent: «when the son dies, the father ceases to be a father» (*mortuo filio, non remanet pater*, DM XLVII, 12, 6). Past actions to Suárez are not the foundation of relation between cause and effect, but only its necessary condition (DM XLVII, 12, 4). In this sense Suárez was compelled to admit that some of the examples given by Aristotle as relations based upon action and passion are not real predicamental relations but only «imitations of real relations according to our manner of speaking» (*relativa realia imitantur secundum nostrum loquendi modum*, DM XLVII, 12, 2).

The third type of predicamental relations are the relations between the measure and the measurable. Things related in this manner do not have in themselves a real reference to something else, like in the first two kinds of predicamental relations, but are called «relative» only «because something else is related to them» (*haec suscipiunt denominationem relativam quia alia ad ipsa dicuntur*, DM XLVII, 13, 3). Predicamental relations of the third kind are therefore non mutual by their

own nature. Relations of the first two kinds can sometimes be non mutual —although Suárez fails to give convincing examples of such relations— but only because of some «peculiar characteristic of either the subject or the term» (*ex peculiari conditione elicuius subjecti seu extremi*, DM XLVII, 15, 8). The foundation of a non mutual relation of this third kind is called «measure» because «such relations are mostly founded upon realities which have a perfection commensurate to others, even if these have no similar foundation for a corresponding relation» (DM XLVII, 13, 8). Aristotle describes these relations as relations «between the measurable and the measure», between «that which can be known with respect to knowledge» and between «that which can be sensed with respect to sensation». Suárez interprets these difficult Aristotelian texts in a peculiar manner. The object known or sensed is the measure of knowledge. Knowledge itself has a transcendental but non mutual relation to its object, whether the object is possible or actually existent (DM XLVII, 13, 9). Whenever the object known is actually existent, the transcendental commensuration of knowledge to its object becomes the foundation of a real predicamental relation of this third kind between the cognitive act (*mensurable*) and its object (*mensura*). By changing the direction of the relation as suggested by Aristotle, Suárez makes the relation proceed from the cognitive act to its object and not vice versa. The object does not have any real relation to knowledge, but, as explained above, becomes only its specifying term and is called «relative» to knowledge by an external denomination based both upon the transcendental relation of knowledge to its object and upon the real but no mutual predicamental relation of the third kind, if and only if the object of knowledge is actually existent.

To this kind of relations belong also the relations between desire and its object, and the relations between habits and dispositions to their object. Although the teleological relation of desire to its object is the most important relation of Aristotelian ethics, Aristotle does not mention it in his classification of relations⁶. Nevertheless, in discussing the Immoveable Mover, Aristotle expressly teaches that It moves everything by being the ultimate object of their desire without any accidental or essential change in Itself⁷. In other words, everything is related to the Immoveable Mover as the measurable is related to its measure, but the Immoveable Mover is not related to anything.

The very possibility of a real but non mutual relation between two entities refutes the opinion of those philosophers, who, like Cajetan, teach that the reason why something can be the term of a relation is because itself is correlated to the subject of the relation. Suárez opposes Cajetan in this point but recognizes that term of a real but non mutual relation can itself be a real relation. A man who desires to be a father makes paternity the object of its desire, but paternity (a relation) does not therefore become the correlative of desire itself (DM XLVII, 16, 18).

⁶ *Met.* V, 1020b 26ff.

⁷ *Met.* XII, 1072 a 26-27, 1073 a 23-25.

Even in mutual relations, Suárez teaches, each term *as term* is something absolute to which the subject of the relation is referred.

Suárez complex analysis of predicamental relations and their comprehensive and detailed classification provides us with the tools to pass judgement on their different manners of being internal to the related terms. As real, predicamental relations of all three kinds are «internal» in the sense of being aspects of reality rather than fabrications of the mind. The fact that they are one of the accidental predicaments could mislead us into thinking that they all are indifferent to the essence of the thing they modify and therefore «external» to them in this peculiar sense. But, as noted before, the term «accident» can be understood in a logical and in a metaphysical sense. Accident in a logical sense is that which can be or not be without any change in the essence of something. As such, a logical accident is a *predicabile* opposed to *proprium* or property. «Accident» in a metaphysical sense is that which is capable of inhering in a substance, and as such it is directly opposed to the category of substance. Metaphysical or predicamental relations, such as relations, are not always accidents in a logical sense. Quantity as such is a metaphysical accident of material substance, but a property of matter in a logical sense. Nevertheless, for a material substance to have *this one particular* quantity, is always logically accidental to it. Intelligence and will, as «faculties» really different from the soul, are metaphysical accidents and logical properties of the human soul. The criterion, therefore, to distinguish whether a predicamental relation is internal or external in the sense of making the terms to be what they are, is to distinguish between relations among universals or among particulars, and also to distinguish between predicamental relations which are logical accidents and those which are logical properties of the related terms.

Predicamental relations based upon physical accidents which are also logical properties of the substances they modify are «internal» in a much stronger sense than those which are based upon accidents which are contingent upon a «circumstantial» order of the universe. Impenetrability and extension in space, at least considered universally, make two bodies similar in a much stronger sense than either color or taste. To decide which physical accidents are accidents or properties in a logical sense is not the result of an intellectual intuition (Descartes), nor an analytic truth based upon a linguistic convention (Ayer), nor the result of comparing the ideational content of subject and predicate (Kant), but the conclusion of an inductive process the scope and certainty of which varies from case to case, as ordinarily linguistic usage normally reveals within an admissible degree of accuracy. It could still be argued that even those relations which are based upon properties of substance are themselves contingent upon the possible or actual coexistence of more than one of those substances. A body can be «larger than body X» in virtue of a property of material substance, but the fact that there is a plurality of material substances is itself an «accidental» and contingent feature of this universe. Still, the comparison between two bodies regarding their

size seems more internal to bodies themselves than the comparison regarding their different shade of green color.

The relations of specific identity and distinction, and the relations of generic identity or distinction —although they also presuppose the contingent fact of the plurality of beings of the same species or genus— are also internal in a very strong sense within the context of Aristotelian metaphysics. The very power of the mind to abstract from two or more individual things (universal) specific and generic concepts is ontologically based upon the real existence of common natures or essences. The paradox which haunts any form of nominalism is to assert that two human beings are similar *because* both of them are called by the same name.

In the case of relations based upon action and passion, one must make a distinction between the relation of the cause of its activity, and the relation of action-passion to the effect. Although the transcendental relation of active powers to their actual or possible effects is obviously internal and essential to the causes themselves, the predicamental relation between a cause and its *de facto* actualization is only part of the contingent order of the universe and as such (not as a fabrication of the mind) «external» to the terms of the relation itself. The predicamental relation of the action-passion to the effect, on the other hand, is as internal to both terms as any predicamental relation could be.

The relations between our cognitive and volative acts to their measuring objects is also internal in a most strong sense, since the objects themselves determine, if not the specific nature of the acts, its individualizing characteristics and traits. In a unique sense of the expression «to be in virtue of» it can certainly be said that knowledge or desire of X or Y is such in virtue of their relation to the individual object X and Y.

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