

HEGEL AND WITTGENSTEIN ON GOD AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD*

HEGEL Y WITTGENSTEIN SOBRE DIOS AL PRINCIPIO DEL MUNDO

JAKUB MÁCHA

Doctor en filosofía
Professor
Masaryk University,
Brno/ Czechia
macha@mail.muni.cz
ORCID: 0000-0001-6394-5173

Recibido: 13/05/2022
Revisado: 01/09/2022
Aceptado: 12/09/2022

Abstract: I argue that Hegel and Wittgenstein, each in their own specific way, used the idea of God at the beginning of creation as a complex analogy for other kinds of beginning, most notably the beginning of philosophical thought. Hegel's *Logic* describes God's mind before the creation of the world, i.e. God's pure thinking. For a philosopher, beginning afresh means resolving to consider this kind of abstraction from the existence of the world. Wittgenstein, by contrast, says that the idea of a creator of the world does not explain anything. It marks the *terminus ad quem* of asking for explanations; we must not ask further who created the creator of the world. Wittgenstein generalizes this for any kind of reasoning: "Explanations come to an end somewhere." (*Philosophical Investigations*: §1) Any sort of explanation must eventually arrive at its *terminus ad quem*, which means only that any kind of reasoning must have its logical beginning.

Keywords: Hegel, Wittgenstein, God, pure thinking, beginning, Logos, creation, Gospel of John, ground.

Resumen: En este artículo sostendré que tanto Hegel como Wittgenstein, cada uno a su propio modo y con sus características propias, emplearon la idea de Dios al comienzo de la creación como una analogía compleja para otras clases de comienzo, en particular, para el comienzo del pensamiento filosófico. La *Lógica* de Hegel describe la mente de Dios antes de la creación del mundo, es decir, el pensamiento puro de Dios. Si la filosofía es un comienzo radical, que el filósofo empiece todo de nuevo significa que se decide a realizar una abstracción radical respecto a la existencia del mundo. Wittgenstein, por el contrario, señala que la idea de un

* This work has been supported by the Czech Science Foundation, project no. GA19-16680S.